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SECOND CIRCUIT-NOTE

courts continually strike out at subtle attempts to maintain a segregated
society, even when it is camouflaged as a legitimate use of a city's police
power. The trend is not to accept seemingly legitimate claims of city
governments as valid on their face. The court on its own initiative
searches into the depths of the problem to discover the true aim or effect
of the zoning ordinance. When, as in Kennedy, the court discovers such
a severe deficiency of equal protection, it will strike down the ordinance
as unconstitutional.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 11

°

The Second Circuit in Matherson v. Long Island State Park Commission"' applied the landmark rule of Ex parte Young" 2 that actions
of a state officer may constitute a state action within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment and at the same time be of an individual
character with respect to the eleventh amendment."13 Thus, while the
110 In England the doctrine of sovereign immunity was based on the theory that the
"King can do no wrong." But such an explanation has been specifically rejected in the
United States. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). Mr. Justice Holmes
thought the doctrine to be based on "the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, (1907). But this reasoning has now been
discredited. For a jurisprudential criticism, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, V, 36 YALE LJ. 757 (1927). In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which
led to the adoption of the eleventh amendment, a citizen of one state was permitted to
maintain a suit against another state. The tenor of the opinion was that the idea of a
sovereign has no place in a republican form of government. The states, however, concerned about being forced to pay huge war debts, were more interested in practice than
theory, and, as a result, the eleventh amendment was shortly ratified. See Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. R-v. 476, 483-85
(1953).
3.11442 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
112209 US. 123 (1908). United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), established that

federal officers were not protected by sovereign immunity where there is an unconstitutional deprivation of property. But on similar facts in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962), the Court held that the doctrine was available. The Court there relied on Larson

v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 US. 682 (1949), which is considered a
modem-day extension of sovereign immunity. The rationale was that the Government
should not be excessively interfered with in its ordinary duties. K. DAvis, DAvis ON
ADMINISrRATIVE LAw 807-09 (1951); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINisTRATIVE ACTIoN

222-31 (1965). See generally Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial
Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 1479,
1484 et seq. (1962). Larson may be relevant to Young to the extent that it affects the
concept of what constitutes an unconstitutional taking.
113 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Court
held that when an officer is acting under a law that is unconstitutional, he is not acting as
an agent of the state and therefore the docrine of sovereign immunity is not applicable.
Prior to Young, however, a distinction had been made between an officer acting under a
specified statute and an officer exercising discretionary powers under the general laws of the
state. See Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1894); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887). Cf. Smyth
v. Ames, 169 US. 466 (1898); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 154 US. 362 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); Allen v.
Baltimore & O.RL.R, 114 U.S. 311 (1884); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
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eleventh amendment is in full effect, it will not prevent suits based on
114
the deprivation of a right in derogation of the Federal Constitution.
In Matherson, the appellees, the Long Island State Park Commission and the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, attempted to limit
the number of cars entering the appellant's night club parking lot.
Police closed the exit on the Jones Beach Parkway leading to the appellant's club; Commission personnel at the toll booths on the Parkway told potential customers that the appellant's inn was closed; and
Parkway police blocked off the parking lot after it was half full. The
complaint, alleging a deprivation of property without due process
under the fourteenth amendment, was dismissed on the grounds that
the suit was barred by sovereign immunity and a failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted. 115
As to the Authority, the court concluded that it was not an alter
ego of the State, relying on Zeidner v. Wulforst." 6 That case dealt with
the New York State Thruway Authority whose statutory authorization
is conveniently parallel. 117 The Commission, however, presents a different picture primarily because of its police responsibilities and authorization."" Thus, as to the Commission, the court applied the
Young rule. 19
With respect to the second ground for dismissal, the court held
that the appellants "stated a non-frivolous claim arising under the ConHowever, the distinction was made in order to prevent suits against officers, who had no
other relation to the statute than the mere fact that they were state officers, in order to test
the constitutionality of the statute. The cases did not stand for the proposition that an
officer who threatened to violate constitutional rights was immune if he was exercising
a duty which was general and discretionary as opposed to a specific duty under a specific
statute. Contra, Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA.
L. REv. 207, 236 (1968). Thus Young is not in conflict with these cases while at the
same time it narrows the scope of the eleventh amendment.
114 There has been some criticism of the reasoning in Young. It has been suggested
that it would have been more logical to rule that the eleventh amendment is overruled
where the two came into conflict. See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and
Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 243 (1968). But in any case it is apparent that the
Young doctrine is essential to prevent the denial of constitutional rights by states via the
eleventh amendment. Id. at 245.
115 442 F.2d at 568.
'10 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
117 Compare N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 150-65 with N.Y. PuB. AuTr. LAW §§ 350-75
(McKinney 1970). In Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), the action
was dismissed on the grounds that the state had granted limited immunity by section
361-b, which gave jurisdiction to the court of claims for suits against the Thruway
Authority. Section 163-a, applicable to Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, is identical
in language. However, in Zeidner, jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship which
demands that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), be applied. But
in Matherson, jurisdiction was based on a federal claim.
118 N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 774 (McKinney 1967).
119 442 F.2d at 568.
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stitution .... ',120 Relying on Bell v. Hood,'21 which held that the allegation of damages suffered as a result of actions of federal officers in
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments stated a sufficient claim
for the district court to exercise jurisdiction, the court stated that the
lower court might have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). However, the action was dismissed with leave to amend "for failure to allege
a statutorily required amount in controversy exceeding $10,000."122
THE WAR POwER
Litigation challenging the legality of the Vietnam War has arisen
in a variety of contexts. Citizens claiming their ultimate liberty is at
stake, 12 3 taxpayers contending their money is being spent for an unconstitutional purpose, 124 young men refusing to be inducted into an
army which they claim is fighting an unconstitutional war, 25 and
126
soldiers who have received orders to report for transfer to Vietnam
12o Id.

121 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
122 422 F.2d at 568.
123 See Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042
(1970). Plaintiff, a college professor, alleged that maintenance of the present military
conflict in Vietnam absent a congressional declaration of war jeopardized his ultimate
liberty, contributed to serious inflation, diminished funds available for social welfare, and
led to the death and wounding of innumerable Americans, including his relatives. The
court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate such a personal stake in the
matter as to warrant the conclusion that he had standing to sue.
124 See Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US. 835
(1969); In Kalish, Plaintiff claimed that a taxing statute was motivated by the need to
raise funds for use in the Vietnam War effort. The court said that the taxpayer did not
have standing since he failed to show that Congress in enacting the Tax Adjustment Act
of 1966 had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and spending power; In Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), a class action taxpayer suit brought by
conscientious objectors to the war, the court held that the Constitution does not prohibit
Congress from levying taxes upon all persons, regardless of religion, for support of the
general government.
125 See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
972 (1967). The defendant was convicted of willful failure to report for induction into the
armed services. The court stated:
Regardless of the proof that appellant might present to demonstrate the correlation between the Selective Service Act and our nation's efforts in Vietnam, as
a matter of law the congressional power "to raise and support armies" and "to
provide and maintain a navy" is a matter quite distinct from the use which the
Executive makes of those who have been found qualified . . . . Whatever action
the President may order, or the Congress sanction, cannot impair this constitutional power of the Congress.
Id. at 324.
See also Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
960 (1969); United States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Prince,
398 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968); United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d
805 (2d Cir. 1951).
126 See Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970); Mora v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). But see Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538
(N.D. Cal. 1970).

